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Abstract— This work proposes a methodology to diagnose 
radiation-induced faults in a microprocessor using the hardware 
trace infrastructure. The diagnosis capabilities of this approach 
are demonstrated for an ARM  microprocessor under neutron and 
proton irradiation campaigns. Experimental results demonstrate 
that the execution status in the precise moment that the error 
occurred can be reconstructed, so that error diagnosis can be 
achieved. 
 
Index Terms— ARM, microprocessor trace, single event effects, 
fault tolerance, fault diagnosis.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE increasing use of electronic systems in safety-critical 
and mission-critical applications has raised the concern 
about radiation effects. Fault tolerance and radiation hardening 
techniques are applied to cope with these effects, and radiation 
testing is then used to validate the error rates. However, 
radiation testing does not generally provide information about 
the causes of errors and the vulnerabilities of circuits. Gaining 
insight into the sources of errors is crucial to understand 
radiation effects and eventually protect the circuits in an 
effective manner. Fault diagnosis attempts to provide 
knowledge about the cause of errors that may enable the 
identification of the most critical parts of circuits and specific 
countermeasures to be taken to mitigate errors closer to their 
origin or before they provoke a catastrophic failure. Error 
diagnosis can also help system housekeeping. For safety-
critical applications, it is important to know if an error is 
tolerable, if the system can still partially operate or if the system 
must be put out of service immediately. The case of 
microprocessors is particularly relevant, because they are 
ubiquitous and, at the same time, they show complex and varied 
failure modes that need to be tackled in different ways. 
Analyzing the vulnerabilities of microprocessor-based 
applications to radiation effects is a difficult task that has long 
been attempted by researchers [1-6].  
In radiation testing, errors are typically detected by 
comparing the output of a circuit with a known correct output. 
The goal of fault diagnosis is to determine when and where the 
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errors were originated. One common approach is to force faults 
at known times and locations, so that the observed fault effects 
can be easily associated to each fault. Focused laser [7] and 
micro-beam [8], [9] testing can be used for this purpose. 
However, the results produced by these techniques may be 
biased, because faults are not randomly produced. Besides, the 
beam spot and step are generally larger than the current 
transistor dimensions [7], [9]. Alternatively, fault injection has 
been used to analyze the vulnerability of the internal structures 
of a microprocessor [10]. However, fault injection does not 
accurately emulate real radiation-induced faults. In addition, all 
these approaches require an in-depth knowledge about the 
internal structure of the circuit under test, in order to focus the 
beam or to inject faults in particular locations.  Finally, another 
approach consists in testing the processor while running a 
specific code intended to facilitate diagnosis or to perform self-
inspection. For instance, in [16] a PowerPC750 microprocessor 
is tested with a “do nothing” loop, to reduce the number of 
susceptible locations, and a “pin wiggler” method that inspects 
the internal registers and toggles a pin if an error is found. 
Obviously, this approach cannot be used to diagnose faults in a 
real application.  
The objective of this work is to provide a means to diagnose 
the faults that may happen in a microprocessor running a real 
application under radiation testing. To this purpose, we propose 
the use of microprocessor trace infrastructures. Trace 
infrastructures are commonly found in modern microprocessors 
to support software debugging. Among the different utilities for 
debugging, tracing is particularly useful to deal with 
asynchronous events, such as interrupts. Trace infrastructures 
have been used in the past for error detection [17]. In this work, 
we focus on microprocessor fault diagnosis. After an error is 
detected, using the approach proposed in [17], trace information 
and context data are collected and analyzed to diagnose the 
cause of the error. 
Software debugging is typically performed through 
breakpoints. When a breakpoint is triggered, the processor 
jumps to a particular application that supports user interaction. 
From this application, the user can get the contents of registers 
and memories to check the execution. This approach requires 
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knowing the control flow of the application in order to set 
appropriate breakpoints.  
Hardware trace is provided to deal with asynchronous events, 
because they are difficult to reproduce and may make the 
processor lose control. A hardware trace unit provides a log of 
the instructions executed by the processor as well as 
information about context switching and interrupts. It can also 
log selected data. This information is continuously and 
automatically logged in a circular buffer, so that the most recent 
history of the processor can be retrieved at any time, 
particularly when the processor crashes. The trace data let the 
user reconstruct the program flow and the status of the 
processor when an event happened. Contrary to debugging, 
which is an intrusive operation, hardware tracing is 
implemented by the processor without interfering with normal 
execution. As radiation effects are asynchronous by nature, 
hardware tracing is well-suited to collect information that can 
be analyzed for microprocessor fault diagnosis.  
Hardware trace infrastructure and protocols are 
microprocessor-specific. However, most microprocessors 
today support tracing and provide a trace interface to access the 
trace information. Without loss of generality, the proposed 
approach has been developed and tested for an ARM Cortex-
A9 microprocessor. To evaluate the diagnosis capabilities of the 
proposed approach, a first experiment was performed with 
neutrons at LANSCE. Then, a second experiment with low-
energy protons was performed at CNA (Centro Nacional de 
Aceleradores) in Spain. The results of these experiments 
demonstrate that trace dump information can be used to 
reconstruct execution status in the precise moment that the error 
occurred, so that error diagnosis can be achieved. The proposed 
approach can also be used online to diagnose errors and 
implement tailored recovery actions for each type of error while 
in operation. 
The remaining of this paper is as follows. Section II 
introduces the problem of microprocessor fault diagnosis and 
summarizes related work. Section III describes the proposed 
trace-based fault diagnosis approach. Section IV discusses the 
experimental results. Finally, section V presents the 
conclusions of this work. 
II. MICROPROCESSOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
Analyzing the causes of errors and the vulnerabilities in 
microprocessors working in harsh environments is a difficult 
problem, mainly due to the limited observability of the internal 
state of the processor during a test. Most existing approaches 
are based on evaluating the effects of many faults and then use 
this information to perform some sort of cause-effect analysis.  
Systematic approaches for architectural vulnerability 
analysis are generally based on fault injection [10]. The goal of 
this analysis is to compute the Architectural Vulnerability 
Factor (AVF) of each internal structure, which expresses the 
probability that a visible system error will occur given a bit flip 
in a storage cell. To this purpose, a large fault injection 
campaign is performed and the effects of injected faults are 
classified. However, note that AVF is a conditional probability 
and it does not include the probability that a bit flip occurs. 
Despite this issue, fault injection results can be used to predict 
a cross-section by calculating the product of the static cross-
section and the error rate obtained by fault injection [11], [12]. 
Nevertheless, cause-effect analysis is difficult because many 
faults produce similar effects that cannot be easily 
distinguished. Some common effects, such as a processor crash, 
may have very different causes. 
In [5] and [6], fault injection was used to induce errors. The 
erroneous outputs were collected in a fault dictionary, which 
were later used to try to diagnose errors during radiation testing 
by correlating the responses of the circuit with those stored in 
the dictionary. However, the diagnosis capabilities of this 
method are limited by the aliasing of the responses, because 
there can be many faults that produce the same response. 
Artificial intelligence methods have been proposed to improve 
cause-effect analysis, such as expert systems, neural networks 
and fuzzy logic. A brief review of these methods is provided in 
[15]. 
In [13] an analytical model for the vulnerability of L2 caches 
is proposed. This model was later validated with data collected 
from error logs of information systems present globally in the 
field [14]. 
In general, fault diagnosis is highly dependent upon the 
quality and completeness of the information that can be 
collected when an event happens. It is also of the outmost 
importance for an accurate diagnosis that this information is 
collected immediately after the event. A hardware trace unit can 
collect enough information to reconstruct the program flow and 
the status of the processor in a non-intrusive manner. The 
proposed fault diagnosis approach is described in the following 
section. 
III. FAULT DIAGNOSIS APPROACH 
The proposed fault diagnosis approach has been developed 
and tested for the ARM Cortex-A9 microprocessor, based on 
the ARM’s CoreSight trace infrastructure [18]. CoreSight 
includes a wide set of modules developed by ARM to support 
debugging and tracing in high-complexity SoC designs. The 
CoreSight architecture is modular, flexible and compatible with 
almost every microprocessor developed by ARM. CoreSight 
components can be classified into three main groups: trace 
source, trace link and trace sink. Trace information is originated 
in the processor and collected by a trace source component, 
which generates normalized packets containing trace 
information. Trace link components are in charge of 
transmitting the packets. They can also include additional 
information, typically related to the source that generates each 
packet. Trace packets are received by trace sink components, 
which enable trace information to be accessed from outside 
CoreSight.  
The device under test was a Z7010 SoC, belonging to the 
ZYNQ-7000 APSoC family supplied by Xilinx. This system 
includes a Processing System (PS) featuring a dual-core ARM 
Cortex-A9 processor along with Programmable Logic (PL). 
Signals from PS and PL can be connected to external pins 
through the Multiplexed Input Output (MIO) interface. It is also 




Extended Multiplexed Input Output (EMIO) interface. The 
CoreSight subsystem included in the PS of the Z7010 SoC 
contains several components. Among them, two trace sources 
have been used in this work, as they provide information that 
can be useful regarding error diagnosis: the Program Trace 
Macrocell (PTM) and the Instrumentation Trace Macrocell 
(ITM). 
The PTM [19] traces instructions executed by the processor 
in real time. It identifies certain instructions and events inside 
the processor as waypoints. A waypoint is defined to be any 
point in execution where an instruction can make a change in 
the sequential program flow. The PTM generates packets 
containing information related to execution flow, and others 
containing auxiliary information as synchronization or context. 
Three packet types have been used for diagnosis purposes as 
they contain PC (Program Counter) address information. These 
packet types are I-Sync, Branch Address and Waypoint Update. 
While the I-Sync and Branch Address packets contain 
information of waypoints that can be directly inferred from 
executed code, the Waypoint Update packet is used to upgrade 
any instruction to the range of a waypoint when an 
asynchronous branch occurs, such as an interrupt or an 
exception. In such a case, the program execution flow could not 
be reconstructed just inferring it from the code. To handle this 
situation, the address contained in the Waypoint Update packet 
represents the last instruction successfully executed before the 
branch was taken, allowing to reconstruct the program 
execution flow in a correct manner. To maximize the available 
PC address information, the PTM has been configured with 
option Branch Broadcasting enabled. 
The ITM [18] generates trace information related to program 
data. Among all ITM packet types, the SWIT (SoftWare 
Instrumentation Trace) packet is the most interesting one for 
diagnosis purposes. This packet can record the value of any 8-
bit, 16-bit or 32-bit program data. To this end, software must be 
instrumented, and new instructions must be added to write the 
values of interest in one of the 32 stimulus ports available in a 
region of memory reserved for this purpose. When a new value 
is written to a stimulus port, a SWIT packet is generated, 
containing both the data value, up to 32 bits, and the stimulus 
port number. 
Information produced by both the PTM and the ITM is 
transmitted through the Funnel and the Replicator to reach the 
Trace Port Interface Unit (TPIU) and the Embedded Trace 
Buffer (ETB), which are CoreSight trace sinks. The ETB is a 
4kB circular buffer which always stores the most recent trace 
information. The TPIU is a standard port which outputs trace 
information. In the current implementation, it has been 
configured in normal mode with 8-bit port data width and has 
been driven to the PL through EMIO.  
A custom IP module, called Program & Data Trace Checker 
(PDTC), was implemented in the PL to decode and check the 
trace packets. The error detection capabilities of the PDTC have 
been shown in a previous work [17]. The PDTC uses the 
instruction trace provided by the PTM to detect control-flow 
errors. To this purpose, it tracks the addresses of the instructions 
executed by the processor and raises an error signal if execution 
reaches a forbidden or unexpected region. For data errors, the 
PDTC checks the range and the values of selected variables 
provided by the ITM. The trace is also stored in a custom buffer 
of 2kB implemented in the PL. Because of the low latency error 
detection of the PDTC, it is possible to freeze trace acquisition 
on both buffers and capture a snapshot of the trace when an 
error occurs.  
The trace information can be downloaded from the buffers 
for offline or online analysis. For testing purposes we designed 
a utility software to read the PDTC status and the contents of 
the buffers, and send all this information through the serial port, 
which is called a trace dump. The trace dump can be obtained 
for every error detected by the PDTC. Once received, the trace 
dump is timestamped and stored by an external host to enable 
further analysis. After collecting the trace dump, the external 
host power cycles the DUT to capture new errors.  
Trace information is almost limited to branch and exception 
PC addresses, CPU context and data values. The PDTC can 
detect errors and activate error signals with very low latency. 
These signals can optionally be used to force an exception on 
the processor to download any further information about its 
internal status after the error has been detected by the PDTC 
and before the power cycle.  
The system architecture is summarized in Fig. 1, where black 
arrows represent trace data, green arrows represent the AXI 
interface and the brown arrow represents a serial port. Dotted 
arrows represent PDTC error signals, which are connected to 
several points in the system: 1) to the custom buffer to freeze 
trace acquisition; 2) to the processor to trigger the exception that 
forces downloading of the trace dump; and 3) to the external 




Fig. 1. Trace generation and processing architecture 
 
A common fault effect is that the processor becomes 
unresponsive, which is often called a hang. There are many 
locations that can cause this effect when struck by a particle. In 
the ARM architecture, one of the most common causes is an 
attempt to access to a protected memory position. In such a 
case, the processor raises an exception and the control is 
transferred to the associated interrupt handler. These exceptions 
are catched by PDTC as a control-flow error. However, unless 
an appropriate interrupt handler is provided, the default 




an infinite loop and the processor hangs. To make sure the trace 
dump is properly collected in these cases, we designed a generic 
interrupt handler that is associated to all unexpected exceptions. 
This interrupt handler dumps the trace to the host before the 
processor is reset. In addition, we also took care to configure all 
unused memory areas as protected areas in the MMU (Memory 
Management Unit), so that we can catch any attempt to access 
to these areas.  
A. Trace analysis 
The recorded trace dump contains relevant information about 
the history of the processor at the moment of the error. A simple 
way to analyze this information, and exactly determine the trace 
value that triggered the error to diagnose it, consists in 
simulating the PDTC with the trace dump. Alternatively, the 
diagnosis could be performed online in the PDTC, but that 
would increase its complexity. A simulation test bench has been 
designed to gather PDTC configuration and trace information 
from the trace dumps and use it as input stimuli for the PDTC 
as shown in Fig. 2. A script-based tool has been developed to 
automate the simulations for each trace dump and assert 
conditions have been added to automatically obtain the report 
of each simulation.  
For every trace dump, it is assumed that the PDTC must 
detect an error in the last clock cycles. When a program flow 
error is detected, the address of the last correctly executed 
instruction can be identified, and also the previous ones. When 
a data error is detected, the faulty data value can be obtained. 
Wrong data can be identified by comparing it with redundant 
data, if the code contains redundant data, or by reproducing the 
execution. Having two different buffers is very useful to further 
investigate whether the stored information is valid or not. If 
simulation with ETB ends without errors, but simulation with 
custom buffer results with an error, it means that the error 
occurred in a point between the ETB and the PDTC, probably 
in the TPIU, provoking an erroneous trace information that has 
been captured by the custom buffer and the PDTC. If neither 
the ETB nor the custom buffer simulations present errors, then 




Fig. 2. Trace simulation test bench 
 
B. Memory and stack analysis 
Trace dump analysis determines the reason why the PDTC 
raised the error signal but may not represent the exact source of 
the error. To improve the diagnosis capabilities, additional 
information can be downloaded when an error is detected. In 
particular, the following information has been selected to be 
downloaded by the system in the case of an error: 
 Stack dump. When an exception occurs, register 
contents in the moment of the exception are saved in the 
stack. Then, the exception handler has been provided 
with a function to read the stack contents and export it 
through the serial port. 
 Memory dump. In the case of a data error, every data in 
the program is exported through the serial port.  
Offline analysis of memory and stack dumps can complement 
trace dump information, providing a richer knowledge which 
ends up in a more precise error diagnosis. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Common experimental setup  
Two different experiments are described within this work, 
presenting particular aspects. However, both of them have a 
common setup, which is described beforehand. 
The Device Under Test (DUT) was a Xilinx Zynq-7010 All 
Programmable SoC device [20]. Zynq devices integrate 
SRAM-based FPGA fabric with hard-core ARM processors. 
We used a commercial board (Zybo) featuring a XC7Z010 
device for the experiments, which contains a dual core ARM 
Cortex-A9 processor, and 512 MB DDR memory. Only one 
core was used for the experiments, at the nominal 650 MHz 
clock frequency. The PDTC is implemented in the FPGA fabric 
of the device and connected to the trace interface as described 
in previous section. We have used the Xilinx Soft Error 
Mitigation (SEM) Controller IP [20] to correct errors affecting 
the PDTC implemented in programmable logic. 
An SD card was used to store the boot code, the FPGA 
configuration file and the application. The device automatically 
loads this information to the FPGA configuration memory and 
to the On-Chip Memory (OCM) of the microprocessor to start 
operation after a power-on reset. 
The DUT is controlled from an external host which is 
connected to the Zybo board. The external host is placed outside 
the beam. It retrieves information during the experiments from 
the microprocessor USB serial interface and also from 
dedicated pins providing the error signals by the PDTC. The 
external host has the capability to switch off the power of the 
DUT and restart again when an error is detected. The system is 
also restarted if the external host detects a timeout or if the 
communication with the microprocessor is receiving corrupted 
data because of malfunctioning. 
We used a matrix multiplication benchmark executed in a 
single core. Two input matrices, A and B, are multiplied to 
obtain the result matrix C. Matrices A and B are initialized from 
a constant memory and remain unchanged. A golden matrix 
(Gold) is calculated at the very beginning of the code after A 
and B initialization and then remains unchanged as well. Matrix 
C is re-calculated in every iteration of the code, so it is 
constantly being updated. The source code was implemented in 
C++. To double check PDTC reported errors, we implemented 




software. Matrices and variables were triplicated, and every 
operation was repeated for the triplicated variables. At the end 
of every execution, the results are checked by comparing them 
with the golden matrix Gold. It must be noted that this 
redundant implementation is not required by the proposed 
approach and it was only used as a means to confirm data errors 
detected by the PDTC. 
B. Neutron irradiation results 
The proposed approach was tested at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory’s (LANL) Los Alamos Neutron Science Center 
(LANSCE) in August 2018. LANSCE provides a white neutron 
source that emulates the energy spectrum of the atmospheric 
neutron flux. We used 16 Zybo boards and thousands of faults 
were observed and analysed during the tests, obtained from the 
irradiation of two versions of the same benchmark: 
 B1: 32x32 matrix multiplication, maximum 
optimization effort, all caches enabled. 
 B2: 128x128 matrix multiplication, maximum 
optimization effort, all caches enabled. 
Neutron test results for B1 and B2 show that over 84% and 
86% of the faults, respectively, were associated to data abort 
exceptions. This result makes sense as the matrix multiplication 
benchmark is very data-intensive, involving many memory 
accesses to load and store matrix values. Therefore, memory 
access is one of the most common operations. It also indicates 
that the vast majority of errors happened in the registers or in 
the cache controller, but not in the memory itself, because the 
latter usually produce Silent Data Corruption (SDC) errors 
which correspond to about 10% of the total in both cases. As 
mentioned before, unused memory areas were protected in the 
MMU configuration, so that wrong memory accesses are 
handled by a custom exception handler that produces a trace 
dump. The unused memory space is 85% of the total memory 
address space. From the trace data we can extract the address of 
the last completed instruction before an error. 
The bar graph on Fig. 3 shows the number of errors obtained 
at each address for 3374 trace dumps in B2. Addresses with no 
errors are not included in the bar graph. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Bar graph of diagnosed addresses for 128x128 matrix size under 
neutron irradiation 
 
Remarkably, there are a few addresses which seem to be 
much more related with data abort errors than the rest of the 
code, namely the addresses 0x001301D0, 0x001301D8 and 
0x001301E0. When correlating the error distribution with the 
code, it turns out that these instructions correspond to the inner 
loop of the matrix multiplication algorithm, where the 
application spends most of the execution time and data memory 
accesses are the most intensive. Going deeper in the code, we 
saw that the addresses in the bar graph correspond to 
instructions immediately preceding a memory access 
instruction using indirect addressing mode (Table I). However, 
it can also be noticed that, while all addresses involved in Table 
I are executed in the same loop, not all memory accesses have 
the same error sensitivity, being the most relevant the 
instruction ldr r5, [r2, #-8].  
 
TABLE I 
DETAILED ADDRESS CONTENTS 
0x001301C4 ldr r8, [r3, #4] 
0x001301C8 add r3, r3, #2048 
0x001301CC ldr r6, [r3, #-2040] 
0x001301D0 add r2, r2, #16 
0x001301D4 ldr r4, [r3, #-2036] 
0x001301D8 cmp r3, r9 
0x001301DC ldr r5, [r2, #-8] 
0x001301E0 ldr lr, [r2, #-4] 
0x001301E4 ldr r7, [r2, #-12] 
0x001301E8 mla r0, r6, r5, r0 
0x001301EC mla ip, r8, r7, ip 
0x001301F0 mla r1, r4, lr, r1 
0x001301F4 bne 1301c4 
 
The bar graph in Fig. 4 shows the number of errors obtained 
at each address for 984 trace dumps in B1. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Bar graph of diagnosed addresses for 32x32 matrix size under 
neutron irradiation 
 
In the case of Fig. 4, there are several addresses that show 
high sensitivity, but it also can be observed that they lie in two 
main error zones. In this case, the addresses 0x001301E0, 
0x001301E8 and 0x001301F4 are also related with the inner 
loop, but there is a second zone  with addresses 0x001302E4 
and 0x001301FC, which corresponds to the checking loop, 
which runs along all the matrices to check their values. Results 
from B1 and B2 demonstrate that the maximum error rates are 
associated to the most executed memory access instructions, 
which is the expected result.  
The case of SDC errors is the opposite of the previously 
discussed one: while the pointer used when accessing to a 
specific memory address can be assumed as correct, the value 
obtained is corrupted. This can be associated to a fault in the 
memory cell or in the register storing the value. Some examples 
that illustrate the diagnosis capabilities are displayed in Table 
II. In these examples, the temporal evolution of data captured 
by the ITM is shown. A mismatch can be observed at instant t, 
which has been normalized to the error instant. In these cases, 
the erroneous datum differs from the correct one in only one bit, 
i.e., it is a bit flip. Moreover, it can be observed that the values 
captured after the error are correct, fitting with the idea that the 




analysis can be correlated with the instruction addresses which 
are simultaneously obtained to determine the region of code in 
which the data error appeared. These results prove that trace 
dump information can be used to reconstruct execution status 
in the precise moment that the error occurred, so error diagnosis 
can be achieved. 
TABLE II 
DATA ERROR DIAGNOSIS 
 t-1 t t+1 
a) 0xF038F057 0x270E04C2 0xA35B81D5 0xF038F057 0x270E14C2 0xA35B81D5 
b) 0xC945A391 0xF1BAD7EE 0x5F8F5440 0xC945A391 0xF1BAD76E 0x5F8F5440 
 
C. Proton irradiation results 
A proton irradiation campaign was performed using the 
external beam line of a 18/9 IBA compact cyclotron located at 
Centro Nacional de Aceleradores (CNA), Sevilla, Spain. The 
DUT was irradiated in open air with 15 MeV protons. The 
proton energy in the active area is estimated in the order of 10 
MeV. It has been demonstrated in previous experiments [21] 
that this energy is enough to produce SEEs in a 28 nm 
technology device without thinning it. 
To better take into account errors in the FPGA fabric, the 
PDTC was duplicated in this case and both instances were 
implemented in the Programmable Logic (PL) of the device. 
Moreover, in this experiment the external host retrieves SEM 
information to register FPGA events that may enable further 
investigation. The system is also restarted in the case of a 
mismatch between the outputs of the two PDTC instances, or if 
the SEM signals an unrecoverable FPGA error. 
Notwithstanding, unrecoverable SEM errors and 
communication errors are not taken into account in the results 
of the experiments reported in this section. 
Diagnosis of addresses and data worked as in the neutron 
experiment. However, the goal of this new experiment was to 
try additional versions of the matrix multiplication benchmark 
and collect more detailed results, learning from the previous 
experience and taking advantage of the higher amount of errors 
that can be obtained with proton irradiation.  
Seven variations of the 32x32 matrix multiplication 
benchmark Code Under Test (CUT) were evaluated under 
proton irradiation. The goal is also analyzing the differences in 
error types among code versions, which could be considered as 
an additional dimension for error diagnosis. The main 
characteristics of the CUT versions are the following: 
 CUT1: all caches enabled, maximum optimization 
effort, matrices and processor stack are stored in DRAM. 
 CUT2: all caches disabled, maximum optimization 
effort, matrices and processor stack are stored in DRAM. 
 CUT3: all caches enabled, no optimization effort, 
matrices and processor stack are stored in DRAM. 
 CUT4: all caches enabled, maximum optimization 
effort, matrices and processor stack are stored in OCM 
instead of DRAM. 
 CUT5: only L1 data cache enabled, maximum 
optimization effort, matrices and processor stack are 
stored in DRAM. 
 CUT6: only L1 instruction cache enabled, maximum 
optimization effort, matrices and processor stack are 
stored in DRAM. 
 CUT7: only L2 cache enabled, maximum optimization 
effort, matrices and processor stack are stored in DRAM. 
In this experiment, memory and stack dumps were retrieved 
for additional analysis. Memory dumps exported all matrix 
values in the case of a data error and stack dumps were triggered 
in the case of exception errors. Exception errors (EE) are 
defined as faults that provoke an unexpected state in the 
processor, so that the main program loses control of the 
execution, which is transferred to a predefined exception 
handler. In the case of ARM Cortex-A9 processor, there are the 
following exceptions: 
 Prefetch Abort. Forbidden memory access when an 
instruction is fetched. 
 Data Abort. Forbidden data access attempt. 
 Undefined Instruction. Unrecognized instruction code. 
Starting from CUT1, which could be considered as the 
baseline version, CUT2, CUT5, CUT6 and CUT7 evaluate the 
impact of using caches in the system. It is important to note that 
DRAM is off-chip, and thus it is also outside of the proton 
beam. However, caches and OCM are on-chip, so they are 
prone to errors caused by radiation. CUT3 may give a figure of 
optimization impact on errors. Finally, CUT4 can be 
representative of OCM error susceptibility and enables 
comparison with caches, which are also on-chip. 
CUT1 is almost the same software as B1 used in neutron 
experiment, so it is interesting to evaluate the similarities 
between these two experiments. In this case, CUT1 showed 
86% data abort exceptions and around 10% SDC errors, which 
is very similar to the behavior found in the neutron experiment. 
Moreover, it is also worth comparing the error distribution bar 
graph shown in Fig. 5, which presents the number of errors 
obtained at each address for 242 trace dumps. This bar graph 
has a very similar shape to the one obtained for B1 (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Bar graph of diagnosed addresses for 32x32 matrix size under 
proton irradiation 
 
As discussed for the neutron experiment, some data abort 
errors can be provoked by an erroneous pointer to memory. In 
the neutron experiments this was only a hypothesis, but in the 
proton experiments the stack dump functionality was 
implemented, so we obtained register values in the moment of 
an exception. We also studied the utility of each register. In 
optimized code, each register has a very specific function 
during the matrix multiplication loop. Some registers store A 




finally others serve as pointers to access all the values. Register 
values can be obtained from the stack dump. The hypothesis 
was confirmed for CUT2, where incompatible register values 
were found in some cases. To give an example, r2 value, which 
stores the pointer to matrix A, was found with value 
0x7a13dad8, which is out of the range of matrix A (0x0013c2c8 
to 0x001402c4) thus provoking an access violation which ends 
up in a data abort exception. In another example for CUT6, r3 
value was also found to be outside B matrix (0x001402c8 to 
0x001442c4) with a value of 0x40148298. A bit-flip on bit 30 
is likely in this case, but r3 value would still be outside B 
bounds; an MBU in bits 15 and 30 would be plausible as it 
results in an original value inside B bounds. 
Error distribution can also be analyzed, plotting error causes 
for different CUTs. In Fig. 6, errors are classified into exception 
errors (EE) and data errors (DE) and are plotted in a normalized 
way. The cross-section (σ) obtained for the total number of 
errors is also plotted against the secondary y-axis, and exact 
values can be found in parentheses below each CUT name in 
the horizontal axis. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Exception Errors (EE) vs Data Errors (DE) 
 
It can be noted that in Fig. 6, those CUTs storing data on chip 
(CUT4 uses OCM and CUT5 uses L1 data cache) are clearly 
dominated by data errors, while those CUTs using DRAM to 
store data (which is not under the beam) are not. On the other 
hand, exception errors dominate when the L2 cache is used 
(CUT1 and CUT3 use all caches, CUT7 uses only L2 cache). 
This result solves the hypotheses made on neutron irradiation 
tests about the origin of data abort exception errors, which are 
demonstrated to be mostly related with the use of L2 cache. The 
lowest cross-section is obtained by CUT2, which uses no 
caches. In addition, CUT3, which is a non-optimized version of 
CUT1, has a higher cross-section, so no benefit is obtained by 
removing code optimization. 
Apart from Data Abort errors, more types of exceptions can 
be diagnosed using the trace information: prefetch abort 
exception (seven occurrences were found in CUT7) and 
undefined instruction exception (one occurrence was found in 
CUT4 and another one in CUT6). 
Regarding data errors, they can have diverse origin, as 
different resources (processor core, registers, memory and 
caches) are involved in the calculations. However, obtained 
data can be used to extract useful results. In the sequel, we use 
several categories for data errors. If a matrix has few wrong 
values (we set a threshold of 25 wrong values), it can be 
assumed to be a localized error, and the number of erroneous 
bits is evaluated into the following error types: 
 SEU: only one bit is wrong. 
 MBU2: two bits are wrong. 
 MBU3: three bits are wrong. 
 MANY BITS: more than three bits are wrong. 
If a matrix has more than 25 wrong values, the number of wrong 
bits is not evaluated and all cases are labeled as MANY 
VALUES error type. 
Matrices A, B and Gold remain unchanged once they are 
initialized, so any error found in any of them can be assumed as 
an error in the memory, or in the initialization process. In the 
former, few bits would be wrong, in the latter many bits or even 
many values would be wrong. Fig. 7 represents the distribution 




Fig. 7. Memory errors causing data errors 
 
It can be observed that most errors are mainly caused by SEU 
faults in the memory. CUT4, which uses only on-chip 
memories, shows the highest cross-section for memory errors. 
For those CUTs not displaying any cross-section value (CUT2, 
CUT6 and CUT7) we did not observe any memory error during 
the tests. The contribution of MANY BITS errors in CUT5 can 
be explained as an error in the cache controller, returning a 
wrong value. 
Errors observed in the result matrix C may be caused by the 
propagation of a memory error in the input matrices A or B, by 
computation errors inside the processor or by an error in the 
memory after the values are stored. The latter is much less likely 
than the former as the lifetime of C values in memory is much 
shorter than in the case of A, B and Gold.  
Matrix C values are the only ones included in the trace 
information and checked by the PDTC. The case of a memory 
error that propagates to the result can be diagnosed by checking 
for errors in the memory when a wrong result is detected in the 
trace. Fig. 8 illustrates the type of errors found by the trace in 
the cases that memory errors were found, normalized over all 
data errors found by the trace. 
In Fig.8 it can be observed that CUT4 and CUT5 are the most 
vulnerable to memory errors affecting trace values as they have 
the highest cross-section values. This fits with the results in Fig. 
7 which demonstrated these versions had the highest cross 
section to memory errors. In addition, it is foreseeable that a 
single wrong bit (SEU) in memory can produce MANY BITS 





Fig. 8. Memory errors captured by the trace 
 
Fig. 9 illustrates the type of errors found by the trace in the 
cases that no memory errors were found, normalized over all 
data errors found by the trace. In this case, the error must have 
happened inside the processor (register, pipeline, etc.). 
 
 
Fig. 9. Computation errors captured by the trace 
 
Information given by Fig. 9 is very rich. Firstly, it can be 
observed that in CUT4, with all the data in OCM, only about 
12% contribution to data errors is found outside the memory. In 
contrast, those CUTs not using any on-chip data memory (OCM 
nor L1 data cache), which are CUT2 and CUT6, show a 100% 
error contribution from the processor and none from the 
memory. CUT1 and CUT3 give a similar figure in cross-section 
and error distribution, demonstrating again that no 
improvement is found in removing optimization. CUT5 gives 
almost the same figure as CUT1 and CUT3, but with a slightly 
higher cross-section. This result could mean that CUT1 and 
CUT3 computation errors are dominated by L1 Data Cache, 
which becomes more relevant on CUT 5. 
It is remarkable that, no matter if the information obtained is 
from the trace, the memory or the stack dumps, diagnosis is 
possible because of the low latency error detection of the 
PDTC, which allows capturing the moment when the 
application has an error to export all relevant information about 
it. 
Finally, errors in the trace interface and the PDTC have also 
been analyzed. In some cases, a false positive (dump with no 
error) is reported by the system. In most cases, it is caused by 
an error in the FPGA, and PDTC duplication enables to detect 
it. But there are cases in which the PDTC seems to work 
properly and even so, a false error is detected. Taking advantage 
of the double buffer architecture displayed on Fig. 1, we can 
store trace information in two points of the trace interface chain, 
namely the ETB and the custom buffer. It can be observed that 
in some cases, the information contained in each buffer differs 
in only one bit in one word. This can be associated to an error 
in the trace interface. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Fault diagnosis is highly dependent upon the quality and 
completeness of the information that can be collected when an 
event happens. Hardware trace infrastructures, which are 
commonly found in modern microprocessors, can be 
conveniently used for this purpose. In the approach proposed in 
this work, the trace is accessed online to detect errors and 
retrieve a large amount of information about the internal state 
of the processor when an error happens. Experimental results 
demonstrated that with this information it is generally possible 
to reconstruct the execution status in the precise moment that 
the error occurred and determine many interesting aspects about 
the cause of errors, such as the address of the last completed 
instruction before an error, the type of error and the location of 
the error. The proposed approach is not intrusive and can 
diagnose the faults that may happen in a microprocessor 
running a real application under radiation testing. It can be used 
offline, to precisely analyze the vulnerability of processor 
resources, or online, to diagnose errors and implement tailored 
recovery actions for each type of error while in operation. 
The proposed approach relies on the capability of the PDTC 
to detect errors and thus obtain error evidence information. 
Because of that, an error which is not detected by the PDTC 
could not be diagnosed with this approach. However, the PDTC 
has been proven to detect most observable errors in previous 
work [17], so very few errors are expected to remain 
undiagnosed. In the future, we plan to improve the 
implementation of the PDTC to increase error detection 
capabilities. 
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